Regulatory Reform Act: Implications for Fire Safety

The Regulatory Reform Act passed by Parliament in April 2001 endows ministers with power to overhaul regulatory regimes under their departmental jurisdiction. Government is obliged to consult widely before presenting a regulatory reform order - the new secondary legislation mechanism established under the act - before Parliament. Essentially, the device is intended to revise and streamline regulation while avoiding the parliamentary time required to enact primary legislation.

Provisions for fire safety have been identified as an area appropriate for regulatory reform. The aim is to draw together within a single document measures relating to fire safety that are currently spread over some 120 statutes, removing duplication and anomaly. The Fire Safety Advisory Board (FSAB) Legislation Sub-Committee  made 37 recommendations as a basis for a Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order.

FSDG would welcome a regulatory reform order that makes understanding of fire safety requirements more lucid and encourages compliance, thereby offering some prospect of raising fire safety standards in the UK.

Reservations that a regulatory reform order would fail to consolidate fire safety in a way a Fire Safety Bill might were tempered at an extraordinary meeting of the FSAB in November 2001. The then Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions and the Cabinet Office suggested a regulatory reform order could in theory embrace all of the FSAB Legislation Sub-Committee's wide-ranging proposals.

Fire safety stakeholders therefore assume fire safety requirements will not fall foul of the current deregulatory tide. Thorough workplace fire precautions, for example, should continue; indeed, fire loss in commercial property is too high for them not to. FSDG advocates straightforward regulation and supports slashing needless red tape, but statutory fire safety is important and must be both maintained and enforced.  It is fundamental to a good business continuity strategy, as evidenced by the high number of firms who experience an arson attack and never resume trading.

Via the Conservative front bench in the House of Lords, FSDG successfully obtained publicly stated reassurance from the Government that a Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order would safeguard life safety for employees and the general public (see Red Alert). We intend to ensure this pledge is upheld.

FSDG's position on regulatory reform is shared among other fire safety interests - broadly supportive and constructive, but conscious that an order must contain scope to consolidate fire safety. At present regulatory reform represents the best chance to modernise and tighten fire safety legislation, which in the past has tended to occur only after a major fire tragedy.

The goal, however, must be to improve - not relax - regulation.

A draft Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order was published in May 2004.  It is being scrutinised by the House of Commons Regulatory Reform Committee who shortly will make recommendations to amend or proceed with the Order.

European Issues: FSDG and the Construction Products Directive


The Fire Safety Development Group has become increasingly concerned about the impact of the Construction Products Directive (CPD) on manufacturers of fire protection products. The CPD, which fairly requires construction products to demonstrate "safety in the case of fire", intends to remove barriers to trade throughout the European Union via harmonisation of standards and test methods. Further unlocking of the European market offers commercial opportunities to many UK firms. However, in the short- to medium-term, the implementation format envisaged poses needless challenges to manufacturers of structural fire safety components and has the potential to compromise fire safety across the continent.

Our main concerns are:

1. Industry will incur substantial costs as a result of the CPD. All manufacturers of construction products will be required to re-test every product to ensure it complies with harmonised standards. A major glass manufacturer estimates this will cost their industry alone in the region of £20 million. Other sectors anticipate similar burden. Yet the same products undergoing re-testing have already demonstrated their effectiveness during real fires.

The European Commission's enthusiasm to conclude harmonisation is understandable - after all, the CPD first appeared back in 1989. But this eagerness means re-testing must be completed within a short timeframe after which national standards will no longer apply. Many firms will be unable to devote the time and resources necessary to undertake such concentrated re-testing. Harmonisation could therefore threaten their immediate commercial viability.

2. The rapid yet uneven implementation process proposed is also likely to lead to some countries embracing harmonisation quicker than others. This is likely to distort, at least temporarily, the notion of a single market. Moreover, in the short- to medium-term it will also do little to advance pan-European fire safety standards.

Our experts have also seen evidence that throws doubt on the capacity of laboratories to re-test every construction product within the anticipated timeframe. For example, there will be only four laboratories in the UK even though new harmonised methods will necessitate thousands of tests. Companies delayed from re-testing will suffer commercially because they will not be permitted to trade a product unless it has a laboratory-awarded CE Mark.

Member States should therefore be encouraged to harmonise simultaneously over a reasonable transition period (preferably 5 years for tests and standards related to reaction to fire and 10 years for fire resistance), thereby forging a single market worthy of the name and allowing manufacturers time to weather re-testing costs.

3. A recent report by consultants W S Atkins (on behalf of the Commission) argued that the long-term benefits of the CPD outweigh short-term costs. It accepts some businesses will not survive transition from national to harmonised standards, but regards this as a positive development which would streamline the construction products sector, enable sector consolidation and create economies of scale. This is a simplistic and somewhat ruthless interpretation, the consequences of which could be avoided if the Commission listens to industry carefully. Structural changes within the sector would then occur as a result of true market forces rather than political intransigence.

4. We are dismayed at the Commission's support for the decision by German and Austrian authorities to "fully notify" their laboratories and certification bodies that will carry out attestation procedures on construction products. The CPD stipulates that a body can only be awarded "fully notified" status when the Commission has published the product standard. The Commission is yet to do so. Other Member States have continued to adhere to CPD rules, leaving their bodies "pre-notified". However, because German and Austrian bodies now enjoy commercial advantage over testing facilities elsewhere, this might only hold for so long. Failure to condemn German/Austrian action gives a green light to other Member States to follow suit.

Haphazard notification of bodies will jeopardise the quality of harmonised technical standards and certification procedures. These can only be guaranteed if introduced with the Commission's uncompromising supervision.

5. Member States remain divided over the function and format of classification documents that will certify a product has attained the harmonised standard. The Commission would be foolish to enforce the CPD amid such disarray.

While classification documents should be concise they must also contain thorough information about the product, the tests undertaken and the laboratory employed. Key data presented and interpreted uniformly throughout the Union is fundamental to achieving a common market.

6. The pitfalls of the planned implementation process have implications for the level of fire safety in buildings through out the EU. Our fears are compounded by the lack of priority the Commission has historically awarded fire safety policy. FSDG is particularly disturbed by the absence of fire statistics collating information from all Member States. Such data is essential to policy formulation and allocation of resources promoting fire safety.

In principle we agree and endorse the CPD's objective of breaking-down barriers to trade, but the methods by which this is to be achieved appear unlikely to deliver the intended goal. Accreditation of construction products must be thorough, transparent and uniformly applied across the European Union in order to guarantee fair competition. Changes to the implementation process will therefore be required if we are to maintain fire safety standards and create a truly single market in construction products.

Building Regulations Advisory Committee Working Group Review of ADB.

The Review of Approved Document B was finally published after a two year delay on 20 January 2000. Our response to the updated guidelines follows below.

Building Regulations remain a key part of the FSDG political agenda. Please contact the Secretariat for more information on current activities.

The Fire Safety Development Group's
Response to Approved Document B (2000 edition)

The Fire Safety Development Group has become increasingly concerned at the relaxation in levels of fire protection in the Building Regulations. This culminated in the changes enforced in the 1992 version of Approved Document B. The 2000 version offers us little more comfort.

We also take this opportunity to answer to the Government's response to the Environment, Transport and the Regional Affairs Select Committee into fire spread via external cladding systems published on 29 March 2000. In our opinion several recommendations made by the select committee and subsequently endorsed by the Government might sensibly have been included in the revised Approved Document B published in January this year.

General Comments

Whilst we realise Approved Documents are theoretically for minimal guidance purposes, in practice they are taken to indicate the required level of fire protection. The FSDG also challenges the underlying assumption that the Building Regulations exist simply to protect lives rather than lives and property. The 1985 version of Approved Document B provided a level of fire protection sufficient for both life safety and property protection. We therefore urge the DETR to consider the socio-economic cost of fire damage in the UK.

The FSDG believes fire safety in buildings is achieved by the correct use of a combination of "add-on" active and "built-in" passive fire protection methods. The "trade off" concept introduced in the 1992 version has yet to be supported by research. In the FSDG's judgement there will be a serious fire, possibly involving injuries and loss of life, directly attributable to the changes introduced in 1992. Recommendations to counteract trade-off are referred to in our consultation response in the proposed amendment to table A2. BRAC ignored our suggestions.

The FSDG welcomes some of the changes in Approved Document B, most obviously the reduction to compartment size from 4,000 sq m to 2,000 sq m for retail premises and inclusion of the new Appendix F on sandwich panels. However, even the appendix perpetuates the misconception that the panel problem is limited only to internal structures. Furthermore, the appendix has no minimal guidance attached to it.

We are also disappointed at the omission of guidance to combat smoke emissions and resultant toxicity.

The FSDG can therefore offer only a guarded welcome to the revised document.

Specific Comments

We would make the following specific comments that appeared in our consultation response and seem to have been overlooked by BRAC (page references given refer to the 1997 consultation paper):

1. Page 7 - Materials and workmanship

The FSDG suggested that the end of the first paragraph should be extended to include -

"Proper materials will be those shown to perform in a satisfactory manner, during the expected lifetime of the building"

We supported and welcomed the introduction of references to product and installation conformity schemes, believing them long overdue. However, we pointed out that the reference to longevity of fire performance does not necessarily follow, whereas improved consistency and quality of work should occur.

2. Page 10, paragraph 0.13 - add item (e)

The FSDG urged consideration for the safety of fire-fighters and emergency workers entering a building on fire to carry out search and rescue operations in accordance with Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997, No. 1840, and in due regard to the attendance and mobilisation times required from them.

3. Page 50 - Shops: general

Cafes
We agreed with the intentions of the proposal, but believed the guidance should be made for all Purpose Groups containing cafes.

Store Rooms in Shops

We supported the proposals, with the exception of the level of fire resistance required. The cost of higher resistance is negligible. Our proposals were listed in a redraft of Appendix A.

4. Page 66, paragraph 5.35 - Protected circuits

The FSDG suggested the addition of the following new paragraph:

"An acceptable alternative is to use non fire rated cables enclosed in a fire resisting enclosure, where the circuit integrity is maintainable under BS476 Pt20 heating conditions."

The reference to small-scale test BS6387 on a short length of cable may only provide a short time in a real fire. A more realistic test would be to expose a long run of cables with fittings and supports. Evidence supporting this view can be found in work reported by BRE in the past few years.

5. Page 67, Mechanical ventilation and air conditioning systems

We proposed the addition of the following paragraph:

"Any ductwork system, including a smoke extraction system, should be able to satisfy the requirements of BS476 Pt24 if it passes through a compartment wall or floor."

6. Page 100, diagram 41 - Pipes penetrating structures

The FSDG suggested an additional comment to the effect that the pipe and sleeve should be adequately supported on each side of the wall - fire protected hangers should be included.

7. Page 101, paragraph 10.14 - Fire-stopping

The comments should have been limited to paragraph 1. The remainder should have been deleted. Such comments may contribute to repeated misapplication of materials.

8. Page 132, section 17 - Fire-fighting shafts

The reduction of fire resistance provisions for buildings fitted with sprinklers is based on supposition of the operability, maintenance and durability of water supplies. For these reasons paragraph 17.7 and table 20 should have been deleted. The content should not presuppose favourable results from a PTI project then believed to be underway at BRE.

9. Page 136-7 - Venting of heat and smoke from basements

The point of passage of smoke outlet systems through compartment walls and floors should be rated to BS476 Pt 24 to avoid spread of a fully developed fire. The FSDG proposed that diagram 59 should be extended to illustrate this popular occurrence. Those that remain within a compartment, as in the proposed diagram 59, may have lower fire resistance levels.

10. Page 162, diagram C5 - Height of top storey in building

The diagram made reference to the height of the top storey. We suggested the height be increased to take in the roof level whenever it supports external services plant equipment.

11. Page 167, appendix E - Definitions

The FSDG felt additional definitions for fire insulation and fire integrity should have been included to assist with ambiguities in the text over the word "integrity". Loose reference to BS 476 is inadequate. Differentiation between cavity, smoke and fire barriers should have been included to reflect day-to-day construction problems and abuses.

Approved Document B & the Select Committee Inquiry into Fire Spread in Buildings via External Cladding Systems

The Minister is incorrect to claim in his response to the Select Committee that no suggestion was made during the review of Approved Document B proposing that the guidance given with respect to external cladding was insufficient or, if followed, was liable to compromise fire safety.

In our comments concerning Section 12 of the consultation paper - Construction of External Walls - we state:

"The combustibility requirements of Diagram 44 (see proposals to amend Approved Document B of the Building Regulations - December 1997) for the external surfaces of walls need substantial revision to avoid fire spread up the external surface of a building."

From what we have learnt about the fire at Garnock Court, Irvine in June 1999, the problem was of this very nature.

We go on to say:

"There is extensive dependence on inadequate small-scale tests for the guidance offered - despite the realisation of the limitations of these small scale tests. ISO TC 92 is recommending large-scale tests to overcome these inadequacies. For example, fire emergent from buildings can and have caused widespread collapse of the entire render system onto fire fighters and others in the vicinity of the building, when applied over combustible insulating materials. The continuing dependence on Class 0 surfaces as the basis of guidance is entirely inappropriate."

Our redrafting of Section 12.7 argues that:

"Substantial modification is required to remove the hazards of contemporary sandwich panels and built up systems containing combustible insulation under Class 0 surfaces."

In its response the Government also pledges to provide better guidance on fire stopping between floors and to support adoption of a new British Standard fire test for external cladding systems. The need for external cladding systems to have cavity barriers or be adequately fire stopped were highlighted by the Irvine fire and the subsequent select committee inquiry. However, it was also set out in FSDG's re-draft of Section 9 of Approved Document B (see paragraphs 9.1, 9.2 (a) and (f), as well as 12.4) submitted to the DETR during 1997.

The fact that Approved Document B (2000 edition) took little account of comments submitted by FSDG provides solid evidence that BRAC has dubious understanding of fire problems.

The Government has consequently missed an opportunity to amend building regulations to ensure external cladding is fire safe.

The BRAC Consultation Process

Our reservations are therefore not only limited to alterations to the document. A more fundamental area of concern is the consultation process itself. The FSDG analysed 176 of the 200 responses to the consultation paper. Respondents were required to express their opinion in a "tick box" method. This closed question approach fundamentally restricted the remit and scope of the consultation process. So serious were these restrictions, the FSDG responded by re-writing the entire document to provide a submission of sufficient detail.

Many other organisations were unable to commit a similar level of resource, and therefore simply made no comment on a large proportion of the proposed changes. We therefore challenge the DETR assumption that a no comment response can be taken as tacit acceptance of the proposals. A more accurate interpretation is that some respondents did not know how or where to respond fully. In our judgement the consultation process was dangerously exclusive and limited genuine analysis and debate. We can only assume therefore that the intention was simply to appear to consult, rather than to actually to do so.

There are profound implications of ignoring or restricting the evidence given by experts. One example of this concerns fire-fighting ladders. The FSDG endorsed the Fire Brigade Union's comments concerning the height of buildings compared to the height of ladders on appliances. That comments of a public service nature such as these were overlooked beggars belief, and must call into question how responses to the consultation paper were assessed.

The FSDG welcomes the commitments made by representatives of the Building Regulations Division at the All-Party Parliamentary Fire Safety Group inquiry into Approved Document B in February this year. These include the creation of working groups to consider various aspects of the Building Regulations at the next review stage. This is a significant step forward and may begin the process of mitigating some past mistakes.

In Summary:

Although Approved Document B (2000 edition) offers some areas of encouragement, the FSDG is disappointed it fails to take more robust steps to tackle "trade-off". We also harbour reservations about the consultation process and the ability of BRAC to guarantee fire safety standards. We hope our recommendations to address these shortcomings will be acted upon prior to the next revision of Approved Document B.
Environment Transport and the Regions Select Committee Inquiry


The FSDG gave written and oral evidence to the Select Committee inquiry into "The potential risk of fire spread in buildings via external cladding systems" in July 1999. A fatal fire in a tower block in Irvine prompted the Inquiry. We believe the fire started in a room on the 5th floor and burst out through the window. Within about 10 minutes the fire had spread up seven floors, but was contained within the area of the cladding. The fire broke through into the building, possibly by means of the area beneath the windows or the windows themselves, and engulfed the upper nine floors.

The full transcript of our written evidence is available by following the link.

The Select Committee report, published in January 2000 recommended:

  • That the majority of external cladding systems currently in use in the UK do not present a serious threat to life or property in the event of fire.

  • That it should not take a serious fire in which many people are killed before all reasonable steps are taken towards minimising the risks.

  • That compliance with the standards set in the "Test for assessing the fire performance of external cladding systems", submitted to the British Standards Institution for adoption as a British Standard, be substituted in Approved Document B for previous requirements relating to fire safety of external cladding systems.

  • That the DETR and Housing Corporation instruct local authorities and Registered Social Landlords to undertake a review of their existing building stock to ascertain how many multi-storey buildings currently use an external cladding system. Furthermore, that these cladding systems should be inspected to ensure that in the light of the Knowsley Heights and Garnock Court fires, no undue risk is posed by any cladding system.

  • That Approved Document B should make clear that any addition to the outside of a building which has the potential to lessen its resistance to external fire spread is subject to the Building Regulations and therefore to the guidance contained within that text document.

That the Committee would strongly support any moves to consolidate existing fire safety legislation.

Government Response to the Select Committee Inquiry on External Cladding

1. Further to my letter of 15 March, I am writing in response to the Conclusions and Recommendations that the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee made in its First Report, which was published on 14 December 1999. As you know, I myself gave evidence to the Committee, and I am pleased to report that we have already addressed most of the recommendations you make.

2. I will address the points made in the Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations on page xii of your report one by one.

RESPONSE TO COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Paragraph 18
The evidence we have received during this inquiry does not suggest that the majority of the external cladding systems currently in use in the UK poses a serious threat to life or property in the event of fire.


3. My Department supports this view and agrees that there is no evidence to suggest otherwise.

Paragraph 19
Notwithstanding what we have said [in paragraph 18] above, we do not believe that it should take a serious fire in which many people are killed before all reasonable steps are taken towards minimising the risks.


 4. I strongly endorse this view. In England and Wales Part B of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations 1991 deals with the requirements for building work with regard to Fire Safety. The requirements of the Building Regulations are primarily to ensure the health and safety of people in and around buildings, and they are written in functional form. Guidance on how the requirements of Part B may be met is given in the Approved Document to Part B. The Department considers that if this guidance is followed then the risk to life safety as a result of fire spread via the external cladding system will be minimal.

5. Following a full public consultation on proposals for amendments, Part B of the Building Regulations and Approved Document B have recently been reviewed by a Working Group of the Building Regulations Advisory Committee. The members of this Group are all experts with a particular interest in fire safety. The review has just been completed with amendment Regulations being laid before Parliament on 21 December 1999, and the 2000 edition of the Approved Document being published on 20 January 2000. The Amendment regulations and the 2000 edition of the Approved Document will both come into force on 1 July 2000.

6. During the review there was no suggestion that the guidance given in the Approved Document was insufficient or if followed would tend to create an unsafe scenario in a fire situation with respect to the external cladding. However, as I indicated in my evidence to the Committee, the Department has asked the Fire Research Station to review the guidance given in BR135:1988 (Fire performance of external thermal insulation for walls of multi-storey buildings) that we refer to in Approved Document B. A contract with regard to this work was let in January this year. The study is underway with a survey of the existing multi-storey building stock in Great Britain to establish the composition and design of systems in use. This will be followed by a series of large scale fire tests to assess the fire performance of a range of existing and new cladding systems. The results of this work will be used to determine the most appropriate method for specifying the fire performance requirements of cladding systems. The revised guidance should be available by September 2001.

7. The intention is that the guidance given in BR135 will be much more comprehensive with regard to external cladding and will include, for example, better guidance on fire stopping between floors. The Department considers that this revised guidance, which it is funding, will help to minimise the risks by indicating what is adequate fire stopping for current cladding systems. This should go a long way towards addressing the possibility of fire spread up a building via cavities behind the cladding.

Paragraph 20
We therefore recommend that compliance with the standards set in the 'Test for assessing the fire performance of external cladding systems' which has been submitted to the British Standards Institution for adoption as a British Standard, be substituted in Approved Document B for previous requirements relating to the fire safety of external cladding systems.

8. The Approved Documents are intended to provide guidance on how the requirements of the Building Regulations may be met for some of the more common building situations. The advice given in the Approved Documents is not mandatory as builders are free to use other solutions that will meet the functional requirements of the Building Regulations. There is therefore no obligation to adopt any particular solution contained in the Approved Documents, and they do not impose requirements as such.

9. The 1992 edition of the Approved Document to Part B, which was in force at the time I gave evidence to the Committee last year, sets out the recommended provisions for the fire protection of external surfaces of walls in diagrammatic form. However in the new 2000 edition of the Approved Document to Part B the test method mentioned in your recommendation (currently BRE Fire Note 9) is now quoted as an alternative to meeting these provisions for the external surfaces of walls.

10. This document has been submitted by BRE, with the support of the Department, to the British Standards Institution for adoption as a British Standard. The relevant British Standard Committee has considered the document and is of the opinion that some technical changes need to be made to the document before it is acceptable as a British Standard. The Technical Committee's deliberations on the document are likely to be concluded by the end of May when the Document will go out for public consultation prior to its adoption as a British Standard. The Department is represented on the British Standard Committee which is responsible for this work.

11. When the technical amendments to the document have been completed, and it has been adopted as a British Standard, the Department will amend the reference in the Approved Document to BRE Fire Note 9 to reflect its status as a British Standard. We will also review whether the reference to this method of demonstrating compliance should be strengthened. It is unlikely that any such changes will be made immediately the status of the test method is changed as such minor amendments to the Approved Documents are difficult to promulgate to ensure that all users of the document are made aware of the change. However, supplements to the Approved Document are planned to give guidance on the new harmonised European methods of test, and the amendment would be included in this.

Paragraph 22
 We recommend that DETR and the Housing Corporation instruct local authorities and Registered Social Landlords[8] to undertake a review of their existing building stock with a view to ascertaining how many multi-storey buildings are currently using external cladding systems; and how many cladding systems are in use which, whilst complying with the regulations in force at the time when they were installed, do not comply with current Regulations. Competent fire safety assessors should then be called in to evaluate what work may be necessary to ensure that no undue risk is posed by any of these systems, with particular reference to the lessons learnt from the fires at Knowsley Heights and Garnock Court. Local authorities and Registered Social Landlords should also be instructed to monitor existing cladding systems carefully to ensure that the materials from which they are constructed do not degrade over time and become less resistant to flame spread than they were at the time of construction.

12. Analysis of 1995 UK fire statistics shows that although the risk of death from fire in flats (purpose-built and converted) was double that in houses, none of these deaths had been attributed to external cladding. Internal factors such as internal layout and lack of fire barriers in floors and ceilings were a major contributing factor. Accordingly, any assessment of a dwelling-based fire risk must address both external and internal factors. A new DETR Health and Safety Rating (which will replace the existing fitness standard) will be an important tool for this purpose because it assesses a range of measures linked to fire risks.

13. Since 1 January 1993 all new cladding and over-cladding should have included fire barriers and therefore pose a minimal risk. External cladding before that date may or may not constitute a risk depending on the design of the cladding, the materials used and the subsequent maintenance. A visual inspection of a tower block would not suffice to assess whether there is a problem; that would require more investigative techniques undertaken by structural or fire engineer, as envisaged in the Select Committee's recommendation. Nonetheless, a stock condition survey could identify the age of the building and the apparent age of cladding work. Analysed alongside information on repair and maintenance activity, this data could be a trigger to instigate more detailed investigative work. The DETR will be issuing shortly (probably May 2000) "Further Guidance on Stock Condition Surveys", which will stress the importance of collecting robust stock condition information that can be analysed alongside other data sources for a variety of different purposes, including making recommendations for further investigative work to establish specific risks to occupants. That document will go to all local authorities and RSLs.

14. I am asking my officials to write to the local authority associations and to the Housing Corporation to draw their attention to the Committee's recommendation and the material in the two preceding paragraphs, so that the requisite messages can be conveyed to local authorities and Registered Social Landlords.

Paragraph 23
Approved Document B should make it clear that any addition to the outside of a building which has the potential to lessen its resistance to external fire spread is subject to the Building Regulations and therefore to the guidance contained within that document.

15. Regulation 3 of the Building Regulations 1991 defines the meaning of building work for the purpose of the Building Regulations. One of the definitions is a material alteration, and paragraph 3(2) says "An alteration is material for the purpose of these Regulations if the work, or any part of it, would at any stage result in a building ... not complying with a relevant requirement where previously it did". Paragraph 3(3) gives B4 (external fire spread) as one of the relevant requirements. Thus any addition to the outside of a building which has the potential to lessen its resistance to external fire spread is clearly subject to the Building Regulations by virtue of the Regulations themselves.

16. However, in both the 1992 edition of the Approved Document to Part B and in the new 2000 edition there is a paragraph in the General Introduction which reinforces this requirement. Therefore I feel that this issue is already adequately covered by the Building Regulations and in the Approved Document.

Paragraph 24
We would strongly support any moves to consolidate existing fire safety legislation.

17. In making this recommendation there was a reference to a letter the Committee had seen from George Howarth saying that he was very keen on bringing in a Fire Safety Bill to bring together the 69 separate pieces of legislation that currently cover fire safety. George Howarth has now moved from the Home Office, but the Home Secretary remains committed to the rationalisation and simplification of fire safety legislation, and I fully endorse that objective. Up to now it has not been possible to secure Parliamentary time for a Bill. However, the Home Secretary expects shortly to establish a new Fire Safety Advisory Board which will resolve outstanding issues and develop detailed proposals for legislative change. The Board will also give priority to examining whether, in advance of primary legislation, it would be possible to make use of planned legislation this Session on regulatory reform to secure some of the desired improvements.

18. I hope that this serves to reassure you that the Committee's concerns with regard to the potential risk of fire spread in buildings via external cladding systems have, or are being, addressed.

- End -
Self-Certification Consultation Paper Response

In January 2000, the FSDG responded to the DETR consultation paper entitled:

"Taking Forward Self-Certification under the Building Regulations". The following is our response:

We are pleased to have this opportunity to respond to the consultation paper entitled: "Taking Self-Certification Forward under the Building Regulations". We have limited our comments to areas of concern to the fire safety industry.

The first question the consultees were asked to comment on was: "Is it sensible to extend the competent enterprise initiative to cover the certification of the whole scheme or project? What are the opportunities and challenges with this approach?"

The FSDG believes that self-certification by competent enterprises is to be welcomed if it removes the current shortcomings in building design, product specification and installation. The concept of self-certification brings with it opportunities to ensure that buildings are designed and built with the end-user firmly as the priority. We were therefore pleased to read that the "competent person" will work with the design team, thereby bringing in self-certification at the earliest stage. As an organisation concerned with fire safety in buildings, we hope this scheme will go some way towards changing the perception of fire safety in buildings. The opportunity provided by the expansion of self-certification is to ensure that fire safety is regarded as an integral feature of the construction process, rather than as an extra irritation.



This opportunity does not come without some major challenges. Perhaps the most significant is in identifying a competent enterprise to monitor the self-certifiers, and if necessary to enforce safety standards. Despite our members' considerable years of experience and knowledge of the industry, we are unable, at the present time, to identify any suitable enforcement agency. Until such time as a suitable organisation can be identified or indeed created, the FSDG has profound reservations about the viability of extending the self-certification project to fire safety.

Our fear is that without enough competent bodies with sufficient resources and technical expertise safety standards will fall. Given that under the present regime 600 people die per year as a result of fire in buildings, we cannot countenance any reduction in safety standards.

Thus the primary practical problem as we see it, is the absence of competent bodies. Should this problem be overcome, the competent body will face a number of other difficulties. Perhaps the most important of these is the issue of public confidence. In the light of the Ladbroke Grove Rail Disaster, the public demand for demonstrable safety standards is intense. Crucial then to ensure that public protection from fire though unseen is not unnecessary. The issue of public confidence is complicated by the nature of fire protection, as fire protection products are the only elements installed in a building that, it is hoped, will never have to be used. Given that the indications of failure in this area are the significant loss of life and/or property, extreme care and technical expertise must be employed by all specifiers, designers and installers, but especially those self-certifying.



We feel this to be especially relevant in the light of the Conclusions reached by the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee Inquiry into the "Potential Risk of Fire Spread in Buildings via External Cladding Systems", published 5th January 2000. The Select Committee concluded: "…. we do not believe that it should take a serious fire risk in which many people are killed before all reasonable steps are taken towards minimising risks" (para 2, p.xii) Until such time as the concept of self-certification has been effectively demonstrated as an improvement on current practice, its application to fire safety will increase risks. In our judgement therefore, it would be advisable to demonstrate the effectiveness of self-certification in other, less critical areas, before extending them to fire safety.

We also have concerns over the costs of extending the concept of self-certification to fire safety. If a competent body can be identified, and standards are raised, it is inevitable that the costs of monitoring such an organisation will increase, than the costs currently incurred by the monitoring of building control officers. The reason for this is simply that more people will be qualified to certificate work, and therefore monitoring costs are set to increase. In the judgement of the FSDG, this cost increase - which will be passed onto the end user - is justifiable if standards are improved and effectively monitored. Our real fear, however, is that competent bodies will not be identified, and will not be properly monitored. The consequential losses of poor specification, design and installation will be immense. We would urge the Department to ensure that this is does not happen. Once again, this argues for the exemption of fire safety from the extension of self-certification, at least until proven effective.

As we believe the lack of a competent body to be foundational to the self-certification approach we cannot comment on parts b-e until such a body is identified. We would, however, be please to comment, once such a body has been identified.

- End -

The FSDG would be interested in hearing from other organisations that responded to the Consultation paper. Please email secretariat@fsdg.org.uk.